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Falling Reserve Balances and the Federal Funds Rate
Paul Bennett and Spence Hilton
The growth of “sweeps”—a banking practice in which depository institutions shift funds out of
customer accounts subject to reserve requirements—has reduced the required balances held by
banks in their accounts at the Federal Reserve. This development could lead to greater volatility
in the federal funds rate as banks try to manage their accounts with very low balances. An
analysis of the evidence suggests that the volatility of the funds rate is rising slightly, but not
enough to disrupt the federal funds market or affect the implementation of monetary policy.
During the past year, required balances held by com-
mercial banks and other depository institutions in their
accounts at the Federal Reserve have fallen sharply.
This development primarily reflects the spread of
“sweep” arrangements, a banking innovation that
allows depository institutions to shift customers’ funds
out of accounts subject to reserve requirements.
Recently, questions have arisen about the potential
effects of the decline in required balances on the inter-
bank federal funds market in which these balances are
borrowed and lent. At issue is whether the interest rate
on transactions in this market—the federal funds rate—
is becoming more volatile as banks try to manage their
accounts with very low balances. Since the Federal
Reserve implements monetary policy by influencing
the federal funds rate, and the funds rate affects other
short-term interest rates, a large increase in its volatil-
ity could have broader implications.
This edition of Current Issues investigates the drop in
reserve balances and its effects on interest rate volatility.
After describing the mechanism through which reserve
balances influence the behavior of the federal funds rate,
we assess the evidence suggesting that lower reserve
requirements are leading to larger fluctuations in this
rate. Our investigation prompts us to conclude that
slightly higher short-term volatility in the federal funds
rate may be resulting from the decline in reserve balances
to date. Nevertheless, market participants have been
adapting well to the drop in reserves and, as Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (1997) noted in
recent congressional testimony, the Federal Reserve has
“not . . . experienced any specific problem in implement-
ing monetary policy.”
A Look at Bank Balances at the Fed
Banks and other depository institutions typically hold
accounts at their district Federal Reserve Bank for two
reasons: to conduct payments activities (sending funds
to, and receiving funds from, other banks) and to meet
balance requirements.1 Balance requirements consist of
required reserve balances and required clearing bal-
ances. (The box describes how these balances are cal-
culated.)
Banks maintain required reserve balances in partial
fulfillment of the total reserve requirement set by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Currently, the reserve requirement equals 3 percent of the
first $49.3 million of a bank’s “transaction deposits”
(demand deposits and other checkable accounts) plus 10
percent of amounts beyond that.2 Banks satisfy most of
this requirement through their holdings of vault cash; to
calculate the amount that they must meet with balances in
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total reserve requirement. The reserve balance require-
ment applies to the average level of a bank’s end-of-day
balances during a two-week “maintenance period”; end-
of-day balances on given days within a period may vary,
although end-of-day overdrafts are penalized.
Clearing balances, the second component of required
balances, are “required” only in the sense that banks con-
tract to maintain these balances at a particular level.
Banks decide whether or not they will  hold a clearing
balance; those that undertake this commitment typically
do so to earn credits that they can use to pay for Federal
Reserve priced services such as check clearing or funds
transfers over the Fedwire system. Although the Federal
Reserve is not allowed to pay actual interest on any 
balances in its accounts, these credits—the near-
equivalent of interest—make clearing balances more
attractive to banks. Nevertheless, because earned credits
in excess of those needed to pay for Fed services are
worthless, the amount of funds that it is advantageous for
banks to hold in their clearing balances is limited. 
Clearing balances are structured to work like reserve
balances in that banks must meet average end-of-day bal-
ance amounts for the same two-week maintenance peri-
ods.3 Shortfalls are penalized, and amounts beyond the
sum of required reserve balances and required clearing
balances are “excess reserves” and earn no interest.
Falling Reserve Balances and the Spread
of Sweep Accounts
In recent years, required balances have trended down-
ward, reflecting a decline in required reserve balances
(Chart 1). The decline in required reserve balances
stems from several developments: In 1990-91, the
Federal Reserve eliminated reserve requirements on
time and Eurodollar deposits and, in 1992, reduced the
ratio used to compute total reserve requirements on
transaction deposits from 12 to 10 percent. During the
same period when these cuts were being made, the vault
cash available to fulfill total reserve requirements
increased, further reducing required reserve balances.
Partly in response, a number of banks opted to increase
their required clearing balances in the early 1990s, but
many have apparently reached the maximum balances
warranted by their use of Federal Reserve payments
services.
While regulatory changes largely drove the decline in
required reserves in the past, the most influential factor
lowering required balances recently has been the growth
of sweep account arrangements. Under most sweep
arrangements, funds in bank customers’retail checking
accounts are swept overnight into savings accounts not
subject to reserve requirements and then returned to cus-
tomers’ checking accounts the next business day.4 In this
manner, a bank reduces its reserve requirement while
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How Required Balances Are Calculated
Suppose that a bank has $200 million in transaction
deposits and $15 million in vault cash. In March 1997,
the bank faces a total reserve requirement equal to 3 per-
cent of the first $49.3 million in transaction deposits,
plus 10 percent of amounts over that, coming to $16.549
million. Less the vault cash, the bank’s required reserve
balance is $1.549 million. Suppose in addition that the
bank purchases $1,000 worth of priced services from
the Fed during each two-week maintenance period. 
Given a federal funds rate of, say, 5 percent, if the bank
contracted to hold a required clearing balance of $0.514
million for two weeks, it would earn credits just cover-
ing its priced services charges.* Thus, during the two-
week maintenance period, the bank would have to main-
tain end-of-day balances averaging no less than $2.063
million, or $1.549 million plus $0.514 million. If the
balances averaged more, then the excess amount would
earn neither interest nor credits.
*More exactly, $514,286 in clearing balance principal times .05 annualized rate of interest times (14 days/360 days per year) = $1,000 interest.
(The 360-day year is an idiosyncracy of interest rate calculation in this market.)
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balancesdepositors retain the ability to utilize their transaction
accounts to make payments or withdrawals.
Sweeps have been implemented by banks in various
forms for a number of years, but since 1995 their use has
escalated rapidly. In lieu of collecting regular reports on
such arrangements, the Federal Reserve in early 1994
began to track the amount of deposits affected at the start
of each bank’s sweep program or any major subsequent
expansion. Summing these initial amounts gives a rough
but useful indication of the size and growth of sweep
accounts (Chart 2).
Using this information, we can estimate the extent of
the sweeps’ impact on required reserves. By February
1997, the initial values of all transaction balances subject
to retail sweep arrangements had accumulated to about
$184 billion. At current reserve requirement ratios, this
development implies that the spread of sweeps has
reduced total required reserves by roughly $18 billion
since the end of 1993. We know that required reserve bal-
ances actually fell from $29.4 billion in December 1993
to $11.5 billion in February 1997, a drop of $17.9 billion.
Most of this decline can be attributed to the spread of
sweeps. In recent months, transaction balances subject to
sweeps have continued to rise rapidly (Chart 2), suggest-
ing that the trend toward lower required reserve balances
is likely to continue.
How will the growth of sweep accounts and the corre-
sponding fall in required reserves affect the market in which
these balances are borrowed and lent? In the next two sec-
tions, we look at the mechanism through which such devel-
opments could affect rates in the federal funds market.
Bank Reserve Management and Fed Operations
One way that a bank can obtain the funds it needs to
meet balance requirements or to cover an overdraft is to
borrow directly from another bank in the federal funds
market, the interbank market for unsecured borrowing
and lending of the balances in Fed accounts. Most of
the borrowings in the federal funds market are on an
overnight basis, and funds are delivered on the same
day that a deal is struck. Indeed, because the market for
federal funds remains active after most other financial
markets have closed, it provides virtually the only
opportunity for a bank to borrow funds in the market
late in the day. Lenders in this market typically are
banks seeking to reduce their holdings of excess
reserves, which earn no interest.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York can influence
the rate on federal funds transactions by adjusting the
aggregate supply of account balances through open mar-
ket purchases and sales of government securities. A key
objective of those open market operations is to keep the
federal funds rate near the level that the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) indicates is consistent with
its monetary policy stance. By keeping the aggregate sup-
ply of reserves in line with demand, the Federal Reserve
has been able to maintain the federal funds rate close to
its desired level.
Banks’reserve management practices also play a role in
keeping the federal funds rate stabilized around its target.
Because balance requirements are met on a two-week daily
average basis, banks can substitute balances across days.
For example, if on a given day a bank finds itself with bal-
ances above the average amount it will need to meet its
requirements for the overall two-week period, it can offset
the surplus by holding lower end-of-day balances on subse-
quent days in the maintenance period. Analogously, a bank
with an unexpectedly low balance one day can make it up
the next, so long as the bank does not end any given day
overdrawn. This ability to adjust reserve holdings across a
maintenance period eases the pressure on banks to borrow
or lend on any one day, reducing the likelihood that supply
and demand forces will cause the federal funds rate to fluc-
tuate very sharply. 
The banks’awareness of the funds rate targeted by the
Federal Reserve can further dampen volatility. Because
the Fed now makes its target rate public, banks will know
if the rate on a given day deviates significantly. In that
event, banks can postpone or accelerate transactions in
the expectation that the Fed will use its control over the
supply of reserves to return the rate to the intended level
on subsequent days in the maintenance period. Thus, the
flexibility that banks have in timing their transactions
helps ensure that deviations from the target federal funds
3
Chart 2
Sweeps of Retail Transaction Deposits 
into Savings Deposits









Notes:  The chart shows the cumulative total of transaction account balances
swept into money market deposit accounts at the introduction of new sweep 
programs. The values plotted are based on monthly averages of daily data.rate do not become unduly large. Note, however, that as a
maintenance period draws toward its end and banks must
meet their balance requirements, this flexibility dimin-
ishes and volatility often increases.
Potential for Higher Federal Funds Rate Volatility
Our look at bank reserve management and Fed operating
practices has revealed how volatility in the federal funds
rate is normally kept in check. We now consider how the
decline in required reserves brought about by sweep
accounts and other developments in the 1990s could
cause volatility to rise.  
With very low levels of required balances, banks will
try to keep actual balances correspondingly low while
avoiding end-of-day overdrafts. A bank might guard
against overdrafts by holding more excess reserves, but
most institutions will want to economize on their hold-
ings of balances that bear no interest. Given the normal
size and frequency of payments-related debits and credits
to Fed accounts, when average balances are lower, the
probability that a bank will end the day in overdraft will
be higher. A bank facing a high likelihood of ending the
day in a negative position must find and purchase funds
in the market. Its demand for funds will be quite inelastic,
particularly as the close of the day approaches. In con-
trast, if the bank were targeting a significantly higher bal-
ance requirement, it would face less risk of an end-of-day
overdraft and have more flexibility to postpone purchases
of funds until later within the maintenance period.
If enough banks are in negative positions or if the
overdrafts are unexpectedly large on a given day, the
increased demand for funds can lead to upswings in the
federal funds rate. If, in addition, the overall supply of
funds in the market is insufficient to meet the demand, the
upward movement in the rate may be correspondingly
larger. But even when aggregate supplies of balances
appear adequate, balances may become distributed in
such a way that banks with an excess supply of funds can-
not be quickly matched with banks that have an excess
demand. Such distributional pressures typically arise, for
example, when payment flows in the banking system are
heavy, such as at the end of a calendar year or on days
when large numbers of securities transactions are being
settled. Under such conditions, low balance requirements
are likely to heighten the volatility in the funds rate by
making it more difficult to relieve distributional pres-
sures. Individual banks will be less willing to supply
funds if that raises their overdraft risk, or to agree to bor-
row funds that are likely to push their balances substan-
tially above the low required levels.
Evidence about Volatility
We have seen that reductions in required balances
could, in principle, lead to a more volatile federal funds
rate. But is there empirical support for such a link?
While direct evidence on this issue is extremely limited,
a look at the record suggests that a relationship, though
modest, does exist. 
First, bank behavior on the last day of a two-week
maintenance period provides a model of how a low-
balance environment can give rise to volatility.  On this
day, banks with excess positions are particularly moti-
vated to sell federal funds, which will otherwise lose eco-
nomic value.5 Banks with positions in overdraft or below
required maintenance period levels will need to cover
them that day. The consequent inelastic buying or selling
pressures experienced by these institutions have tended to
create volatility in the price of funds. Indeed, the range of
interest rates on federal funds transactions is typically
much wider on the final days of maintenance periods.
Evidence that lower reserve balances can trigger
higher volatility is also provided by the behavior of the
federal funds rate at the end of 1990, when reserve
requirements on wholesale deposits were eliminated. The
cut in requirements coincided with a seasonal decline in
required reserves and a rise in vault cash associated with
year-end holidays—two events that together bring
required reserve balances to their annual low point at the
beginning of each new year. The consequent large drop in
required balances was accompanied by an unusual rise in
excess reserves and a dramatic increase in the intraday
volatility of the federal funds rate. Rates on transactions
ranged from near zero at times to as high as 100 percent,
with some days seeing extremes in both directions. The
extreme rate movements persisted for several weeks in
1991 until required reserve balances rose above their
early-year low point and banks increased required clear-
ing balances.
Further evidence of a linkage between balance
requirements and volatility is offered by an apparent
upward tilt in federal funds rate volatility during the past
year. Using the available measure of intraday volatility—
the difference between the highest and the lowest rates
observed on transactions—we can put this most recent
trend in some historical perspective. Over the last two
decades, monthly averages of these high-low spreads
have been extremely variable, and in some periods have
exhibited persistently high levels (Chart 3). Volatility was
particularly marked in the early 1980s, when the FOMC
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Since 1995, as the increased use of sweeps
has lowered required balances, intraday
volatility has . . . moved upward.was targeting reserve aggregates rather than particular
levels of the federal funds rate, and transactions conse-
quently took place over a wide range of rates. In late 1990
and the first quarter of 1991, as noted earlier, volatility
rose sharply after reserve requirements on wholesale
deposits were dropped. Following that episode, however,
volatility trended downward for several years, in part
because banks were improving their account monitoring
and management capabilities.6
Since 1995, as the increased use of sweeps has lowered
required balances, intraday volatility has again moved
upward. During the second half of 1996, this measure fre-
quently reached 200 basis points (excluding settlement
Wednesdays) on a monthly average basis, a relatively
high level by recent historical standards.
Why Concerns about Volatility May Be Exaggerated 
The empirical evidence suggests that low balance
requirements do contribute to higher federal funds rate
volatility. But even if we should expect the current rise
in volatility to continue as sweeps depress banks’
reserve balances further, the increase is likely to be lim-
ited in scope and effect.
The 1990-91 episode reveals that the conditions
accompanying a drop in required reserves will signifi-
cantly influence the degree of ensuing volatility. In 1990,
reserve requirements were reduced at the same time that
year-end pressures from balance sheet adjustments and
large payment flows were building in the federal funds
market. Moreover, because the reduction resulted from
changed regulatory mandates, the effects were concen-
trated within a very short time span. These factors go far
toward explaining the unusually severe fluctuations in the
federal funds rate in this period.
By contrast, the current decline in required balances has
taken place at the initiative of the banks and has been dis-
tributed over a number of quarters. Banks expanding sweep
arrangements have been making their own judgments
about their abilities to manage their Fed accounts with
lower balances and have been able to adjust gradually to
the changing conditions in the federal funds market. 
Also reassuring is that the current rise in volatility has to
date been rather modest and its effects contained. Greater
fluctuation in the intraday federal funds rate has not led to
increased volatility in other interest rates. Moreover,
because the FOMC promptly publicizes changes in the tar-
geted federal funds rate, moderately greater volatility in the
funds rate is unlikely to confuse market participants about
the intended stance of monetary policy.7
Conclusion
There are valid reasons to believe that very low
required balance levels induce higher federal funds rate
volatility. With banks seeking to end the business day
with low balances while avoiding end-of-day over-
drafts, a distributional imbalance of funds among banks
or an aggregate surplus or shortage of funds is more
likely to trigger fluctuations in the funds rate. The his-
torical record confirms the relationship between
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Even if we should expect the current rise in
volatility to continue as sweeps depress banks’
reserve balances further, the increase is
likely to be limited in scope and effect.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
reserve levels and volatility: in 1990-91 and again in
the years since 1994, reduced reserves have been
associated with a widening of the intraday range of the
federal funds rate.
To date, however, significantly lower balance require-
ments have not interfered with the smooth functioning of
the federal funds market. The drop in balances has been
gradual, and the sweep programs that are responsible for
the drop have been carried out at the discretion of the
banks. As a result, the observed increase in volatility has
not reduced the effectiveness of banks’ money market
operations nor affected the implementation of monetary
policy. To be sure, sweep accounts are still growing, and a
continuing decline in balance requirements could over
time increase federal funds rate volatility more dramati-
cally. Nevertheless, it appears that market participants are
currently adjusting well to the changing environment.
Notes
1. All depository institutions will be referred to as “banks” for the
remainder of this article.
2. For more details, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1997).
3. For more information on required clearing balances, see Stevens
(1993).
4. For a more detailed description of the mechanics of different
types of sweep arrangements, see Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (1996).
5. Federal Reserve Board Regulation D restricts the amount of
reserves a bank can carry over into the next maintenance period to
4 percent or less of its required reserves. 
6. For example, since the middle of the 1980s, the Federal Reserve
has made available computer screens that allow banks to track
large-dollar payment systems debits and credits to their Fed
accounts.  The usefulness of this information system to bank money
managers increased markedly in the early 1990s, when the Fed
began to enter virtually all debits and credits on the real-time intra-
day totals transmitted to banks, essentially giving them very timely
account balance estimates to compare with their internal informa-
tion flows and projections.
7. One final consideration that should temper concerns about
increasing volatility is related to our measure of volatility, the dif-
ference between the high and low rates on federal funds transac-
tions in any one day. This measure may exaggerate the degree of
volatility that actually exists because it captures extreme values and
does not distinguish between transactions in which the dollar
amount borrowed is small and transactions in which large sums
change hands. Indeed, much of the recent moderate widening in the
trading range appears due to smaller transactions.
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